Bold claim: Russia aimed to reshape global order, but the reality turned out far from the plan. Four years after Vladimir Putin escalated the Ukraine conflict into a full-scale war, the expected rapid victory and rapid absorption of Ukraine never materialized. The vision was to tilt the world from a unipolar framework dominated by the United States to a multipolar landscape where Russia would stand as one of several great powers. Yet Russia has found itself as a middle power in practice, increasingly dependent on China while facing a chorus of adversaries and obstructors among smaller powers. In short, the ambitious dream of becoming a leading great power in a new world order has faltered severely.
How did this unfold?
Four years on, Russia struggles to align with other major powers willing to redraw the map. Its status remains that of a middle power rather than one of the “greats,” and Moscow has found itself leaning more on China for support while contending with multiple antagonistic states that repeatedly thwart its aims. The outcome is arguably one of the starkest reversals of a strategic fantasy in recent memory.
Be careful what you wish for
Lately, Russia watched as the United States and Israel—acting in ways that echo Moscow’s own playbook—disregarded international law and attacked Iran, a longtime ally. When Iran asked for Russian assistance, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke more like a European statesman than a champion of a new world order, condemning the strikes as an unprovoked violation of fundamental international norms and urging a peaceful, law-based resolution that respects mutual interests.
As The Guardian described, the willingness to abandon old geopolitical rules has not necessarily benefited Russia. Moscow appears to have overestimated how much room the old order gave it to maneuver. When others adhered to the rules, breaking them could offer a tactical edge; once others embraced raw power, the limits of Russia’s capabilities became clear.
Reality checks
The first literal reality check came on the battlefield. Russia failed to subdue Kyiv, retreated from large parts of the north, and began a grueling war of attrition in the east. Ukraine, for its part, ceded some territory in the south, enabling Russia to create a land corridor linking Donbas to Crimea (which Russia occupies in 2014). Yet Kyiv maintained control of about 80 percent of its territory and retained access to the Black Sea, a crucial conduit to global markets.
Unable to secure a decisive on-ground victory, Russia shifted to a high-risk air campaign aimed at civilian infrastructure to paralyze Ukraine and force submission. Such tactics tend to cause immense civilian suffering and rarely accelerate peace negotiations in a constructive way. Meanwhile, Ukraine continued to resist Russia’s pressure at the negotiating table, preserving its sovereignty and strategic options.
Being a great power has its costs
All of Russia’s efforts have been complicated by the emergence of a multipolar world that Moscow had hoped to shape anew. Ukraine has benefited from a coalition of middle powers that are gradually finding their footing in this new order. Russia, by contrast, now faces a harsh financial and political reality: its ambitions as a leading great power are economically unsustainable. Demographic trends are unfavorable, GDP (adjusted for purchasing power) places Russia in the range of Japan or Germany rather than the era’s largest economies, and the economy remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports facing a decarbonizing world.
As a major middle power with a permanent UN Security Council seat and a sizeable nuclear arsenal, Russia could still cause significant disruption if it chose to press its advantage. But the results have not matched its ambitions.
From aspiration to consequences
Russia’s efforts to project power beyond Ukraine have faltered in several regions. Its relationship with Israel has cooled, it has lost influence in Syria, and it has found it difficult to support allies like Iran and Venezuela in a lawless international environment where Moscow’s clout seems increasingly limited.
In this shifting landscape, China has celebrated a “no-limits partnership” with Russia but avoided taking a clear side in Moscow’s Ukraine war or supplying weapons. Instead, Beijing has leveraged Russia’s isolation to strengthen its own position globally.
India, meanwhile, has expanded its purchase of discounted Russian oil and continued arms purchases as part of a broader strategy to maintain autonomy in foreign policy, treating Moscow more as a partner to be managed than a true equal.
Fantasy versus reality
Ukraine, meanwhile, lost some early momentum but continued to receive substantial military and financial support from a flexible coalition of middle powers. Data tracking military aid shows that roughly 30 percent of total U.S. military assistance since the war’s start represents about US$75 billion, while the remaining 70 percent comes from middle and smaller powers led by Germany, the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden. This dynamic helped accelerate the multipolar shift that Russia had hoped to prevent.
In the end, Moscow’s war did contribute to the rise of a multipolar world, but not in the way it envisioned. The new order is real, diverse, and less favorable to Russia’s strategic aims than Moscow anticipated.
And this is where the controversy lies: does the emergence of multipolarity inherently undermine U.S. leadership, or does it simply reshape influence in more complex, diffuse ways? What’s your take on who benefits most from a multipolar world—and why?
